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ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff has no common-law negligence claim against the United States
because Utah's Dramshop Act preempts common-law claims.
As discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, Plaintiffs' Complaint

appears to allege causes of action based on both Utah's Dramshop Act and
common-law negligence. Plaintiffs now acknowledge that they cannot proceed
under the Dramshop Act because the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") does not
waive the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to the Dramshop Act's
strict-liability provisions. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 17-19. In lieu of that
claim, Plaintiffs contend that they can proceed on a common-law negligence
theory. In order to do so, however, Plaintiffs would have to base their negligence
claim on facts that fall squarely within the terms of the Dramshop Act. Plaintiffs
cannot do so because Utah's Dramshop Act preempts such a claim.
Prior to the enactment of the Dramshop Act, this Court consistently
followed the common-rule that a person or entity that served alcohol to an
intoxicated person had no liability to a third party who was injured by the
intoxicated person. Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc.. 1 P.3d 528, 532 (Utah), cert,
denied, 531 U.S. 1011 (2000): but cf. Rees v. Albertson's, Inc.. 587 P.2d 130,133
(Utah 1978) (recognizing a cause of action against a vendor of alcohol who sold
the alcohol negligently and in violation of a statute to an underage purchaser).
1

In 1981, the Utah legislature enacted the Dramshop Act, creating a
comprehensive system of liability on the part of purveyors of alcohol. That
statute, together with subsequent amendments, provides a detailed procedural and
substantive framework for claims against alcohol purveyors. Among other things,
the Dramshop Act
(1)

designates the circumstances under which
commercial alcohol providers may be held
liable,

(2)

designates the more limited circumstances
under which private alcohol providers may
be held liable,

(3)

provides for vicarious liability of employers,

(4)

provides for the survival of a claim in the
case of the death of a claimant,

(5)

establishes limits of damages recoverable,

(6)

establishes a two-year statute of limitations,

(7)

preserves claims with no damage limitation
against the intoxicated person who causes
injury or death, and

(8)

prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees who use their independent
judgment in refusing to sell alcohol to
persons described in the statute.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-14a-101, et seq. (2001 Repl.).

2

In the 22 years since the enactment of the Dramshop Act, this Court has
declined to expand the liability of alcohol purveyors by recognizing common-law
claims outside the scope of the Act. See, ej*., Adkins. 1 P.3d at 533 (holding that
a party injured by an intoxicated person cannot base a cause of action against a
dramshop either on common-law negligence or on a violation of the Utah Liquor
Control Act). Moreover, even if this Court would be inclined to recognize a
common-law claim in the absence of governing legislation, the Dramshop Act
preempts the development of common-law liability on the part of alcohol
providers. Gilger v. Hernandez. 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000). The Dramshop Act
preempts such a claim even where the Act excludes that claim from its coverage.
I d at 307-10.
In Gilger. the plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries they suffered when
they were stabbed by an intoxicated minor who had been served beer at the
defendant's private residence. The plaintiffs did not assert a claim under the
Dramshop Act because the version then in effect excluded claims against social
hosts who served beer to minors.1 Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that the

'The Dramshop Act has subsequently been amended to include liability for social
hosts who provide beer to minors. Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-1-105(2), 32A-14a102(2)(2001 Repl.).
3

defendant was negligent per se because she had violated Utah criminal law by
providing alcohol to a minor. Id. at 306.
The defendant argued that the Dramshop Act preempted the plaintiffs'
common-law claim. The plaintiffs responded that the Dramshop Act did not
preempt their common-law claim because the Act did not impose liability for the
acts alleged in their complaint, and the Act did not explicitly bar general
negligence liability. Id at 307-8.
This Court held that the comprehensive nature of the Dramshop Act's civilliability provisions evidenced a legislative intent to preempt common-law
negligence claims against alcohol providers. "The Act evidences an overall
scheme of regulation of liability for liquor providers. Its very comprehensiveness
suggests a purpose and intent to preempt inconsistent common law." Id at 309.
The Court held that the plaintiffs' claim was preempted despite the fact that the
Dramshop Act then in effect exempted the defendant from liability. "Even if this
court were to find that there was common law liability for social hosts who serve
beer to minors, such liability would be preempted by the Dramshop Act." IdL at
308.
This Court has subsequently reaffirmed its determination that
comprehensive legislation preempts the development of overlapping common-law

4

claims, even where the plaintiff will be left without a remedy. In Gottling v. P.R.
Incorporated, 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002), the plaintiff asserted a common-law
wrongful-termination claim, alleging that she was terminated from her
employment because of her refusal to engage in a sexual relationship with the
company's owner. The plaintiff did not seek recovery under the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act ("UADA") because the company employed fewer than 15
employees and thus was excluded from the UADA's coverage. Instead, the
plaintiff asserted a common-law tort claim based on an alleged public policy
against sexual discrimination. Id. at 991.
This Court rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the UADA
preempted common-law employment-discrimination claims. The Court relied in
part on the fact that the UADA contains explicit language stating that it is the sole
basis for employment-discrimination claims under Utah law. Id. at 992. The
Court also said, however, that the UADA would preempt common-law claims
even in the absence of such language. The Court reasoned that it must defer to the
legislature's policy decisions. "Simply put, we must not craft a remedy where the
legislature intends no remedy to exist. To do otherwise trespasses upon the
legislative domain and threatens the fragile balance of power upon which our
system of government rests." Id. at 998. The Court held that the plaintiffs

5

common-law claim was preempted even though the plaintiff had no recourse under
the UADA. "[N]ew statutory schemes, in certain circumstances, may preclude
formerly available common law causes of action, despite leaving some individuals
without a remedy." I d at 997 (citing Gilger, 997 P.2d at 309-10).
The present case presents an even more compelling case for preemption
because Plaintiffs' allegations fall squarely within the liability provisions of the
Dramshop Act. Plaintiffs allege that alcohol was served to Mr. Valle when he was
apparently under the influence of alcohol; that the service of the alcohol to Mr.
Valle caused his intoxication; and that the collision that caused Plaintiffs' injuries
resulted from Mr. Valle's intoxication. Complaint at 3-4, <H 8-10 (U.S. District
Court record, document 1). These allegations would state a cause of action against
a private person or entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(l)(b) (1999 Repl.).
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, their claim is against the United States, which has not
waived its immunity from Plaintiffs' strict-liability claim under the Dramshop Act.
Thus, the deficiency in Plaintiffs' claim is not the result of a gap in the Dramshop
Act's coverage, but rather the result of the FTCA's preservation of the United
States' sovereign immunity against "strict liability of any sort." Laird v. Nelms,
406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972).

6

Plaintiffs surges I (IKI1 'fir- * ouii could overcome the United States'
soveicigii immiiim v in nfher of two ways. First, Plaintiffs suggest that the Court
i Mild ereate a system of negligence per se based on the criminal provisions of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act ("ABCA"). See Plaintiffs' Opening Brie! ai 810. Plaintiffs' theory is undermined by a comparison of those prov
civil-liability provisions of the Dramshop Act. I he \B( 'A imposes o

IIIHH il

penalties for providing alcohol to the following i ateii* n itw < >1 pers<ins i 1) any '
person under the age .

y eai s. i/. I .in \ \iei s<- HI W (I* I IS apparently under the

influence of intoxicating ah ih< tin heNrm^"' or who the provider "knew or
should i

the circumstances was under the influence of

iiitti'Xieafyig alcoholic beverages"; and (3) any "known interdicted persor " Utah •
Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-203, -204, -205 (2001 RepL). These are precisely the same
categories of persons listed in the Dramshop Act's provisions imposing
commercial providers of alcoholic beverages. See Utah Code Ann. <
102(l)(b)(ii) (2001 RepL). Thus, Plaintiffs'suggest
liability directly in conflict with
legislature !-

ui tun
fact that the Utah

of persons in both the criminal and civil
demonstrates its intent that injured parties should
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not be allowed to rely on the criminal provisions to make an end run around the
comprehensive liability provisions of the Dramshop Act.
Plaintiffs' second suggestion is that this Court could fashion a unique cause
of action applicable only to the United States. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 2324. This theory, while creative, would be ineffectual. The fundamental principle
governing the United States' tort liability under the FTC A bears repeating: The
United States is liable only to the extent "a private individual under like
circumstances" would be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs'
proposed common-law claim would fall outside the scope of the FTC A, however,
because it would apply only to the United States and not to "a private individual
under like circumstances." Thus, the ironic result of Plaintiffs' proposal for a
common-law claim targeted only at the United States is that such a claim would
not meet the express requirements of the FTCA.
In order to create a claim applicable to the United States, this Court would
have to recognize a negligence claim applicable not just to the United States, but
to all persons and entities. Injured parties would be able to pursue either a strictliability claim under the Dramshop Act, or a negligence claim, or both. While the
creation of a second layer of liability would give injured parties more options, it
would simultaneously nullify the legislature's decisions regarding the appropriate

8

balance betw, ^

npensation on the one hand, and protection of alcohol
Commercial alcohol purveyors would be subject to a

c

i • -i

* J of claims, and the duration of their potential liability would 'H

extended from two years to four years. More importantly, commercial pin lv< >i
would face a dramatic increase in their potential liability a i u I i n M 11. n u r o > s r > • \ i
the same time, non-commercial alcohol provide! s

<\ In> me I ublr under the

Dramshop Act only for providing

would be at risk for a wider

variety of potential claims, i ilh yiiIifii»(o:t rlama^s.
Thest u
enac

iI

nsiderations facing the legislature when it

*shop legislation. The fact that the FTCA excludes strictfrom its coverage is not a sufficient reason to upset the

legislature's resolution of these issues. If public policy demands that the federal
government bear liability under the Utah Dramshop u

i

consideration by Congress in its evaluation of the
immunity, or by the Utah legislature

i v. 11
mpropriate type of

proof to be required undei
[Rjespect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking
requires that the judiciary not interfere with enactments of
the Legislature where disagreement is founded only on
policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs
reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate objective. Tn
matters not affecting fundamental rights, the prerogative of
9

the legislative branch is broad and must by necessity be so
if government is to be by the people through their elected
representatives and not by judges.
Gottlmg, 61 P.3d at 998 (citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah
1979)).
In Gilger, this Court correctly concluded that the Utah legislature intended
to occupy the field of dramshop liability when it enacted comprehensive
legislation governing the civil liability of alcohol purveyors. There is no rationale
or precedent for this Court to create a system of common-law liability that would
directly conflict with the statutory system of liability already authorized under
Utah's Dramshop Act. Plaintiffs' request that this Court do so should be rejected.
Plaintiffs accurately point out that courts in a number of other jurisdictions
have recognized a common-law cause of action against dramshops. See Plaintiffs'
Opening Brief at 12-15. The case law cited by Plaintiffs does not support their
argument, however. Most of the cases arose in states without dramshop statutes.
In the absence of dramshop legislation, of course, the issue of preemption does not
arise. Moreover, those courts frequently relied on criminal statutes, like those in
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which prohibit the distribution of alcohol
to minors, inebriated individuals, or other classifications of persons. See, e.g.,
Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980); Hutchens v. Hankins. 303 S.E.2d
584 (N.C. App. 1983). As discussed above, the Utah legislature has already
10

incorporated those class if icut i< HI*- 14 persons into the civil-liability provisions of
the 1 h .mishop Ai (, I Ims, the circumstances that persuaded the courts in states
fiiiitm diamshop legislation to fill the liability vacuum do not exist in Utah,
Even where courts have recognized common-law dramshop 11 aims m
jurisdictions with dramshop statutes, the courts have genei ally 11 vi >j: 11»ia I
common-law claims only where expressly authorized hy sialnlc or where
necessary to fill substantial gaps in tin: >,( it«!i< »f \ >'«n r^n/i1 Scy e.g , Largo Corp.
v. Crespin, 727 V 2,d 10%, ! H7> " A - \nK^^f (tvcognizing a common-law cause
of action wherr t <' 11 u r; u li. • 11.111 is I io|»statute governed only "extremely limited
circumstances." i < • 11te s< • i v »cc of alcohol to "habitual drunkards" about whom a
v^
n v

ad been issued); Thaut v. Finlev. 209 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. App.),
;

; ; 3 N.W.2d 820, 821-2 (Mich. App. 1973) (recognizing a commc

cause of action against a social host where the Michigan dramshc
contained no provision for liability of social hosts); Trail v. Christiai
618, 621-25 (Minn. 1973) (recognizing a c
of "3.2 beer" where Minneso,
sale oi
claims ,i
*

_ r/i.

« t
.W.2d

\ action for the sale
excluded any liability for the

ramshop statute preempted common-law
rages defined therein); Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., Inc.,
i ^4-5 (N.C. 1998) (recognizing a common-law claim for the
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negligent sale of alcohol to a minor, where North Carolina's dramshop statute
expressly preserved common-law claims); Mason v. Roberts, 294 N.E.2d 884,
887-8 (Ohio 1973) (recognizing a common-law cause of action where the Ohio
dramshop statute applied only to the sale of alcohol to persons "blacklisted" on an
order issued by the Department of Liquor Control).
Plaintiffs rely primarily on Craig v. DriscolL 813 A.2d 1003 (Conn. 2002),
where a three-to-two majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a
broad common-law dramshop liability in the face of equally broad dramshop
legislation. The United States submits that the Craig decision improperly blurs the
division between the legislative and judicial roles.
In Craig, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a common-law claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by Connecticut's
dramshop statute. Unlike Utah's Dramshop Act, the Connecticut statute did not
require any proof of a causal link between the providing of alcohol to an
intoxicated person and the intoxication that caused the subsequent injury. The
Connecticut statute provided for a damage limitation of $20,000. The Connecticut
Supreme Court held that "recognition of a common-law negligence action neither
conflicts with the act nor thwarts its underlying purpose.... The act provides a
means of recovery for plaintiffs who are unable to prove causation and culpability,

12

subjecttoastatatoiylpi-iii.il

• • •Kimages." 813 A.2dat 1014. Thecourt

decided that because ol (lie modest damage limit in the Connecticut statute, it was
appro)male in supplement the legislation.
[The dramshop act] sets, in essence, a minimum recovery
opportunity for persons injured as a result of the sale of
liquor to an intoxicated person. By setting a floor,
however, the legislature did not also intend to be setting a
ceiling - - and we are free, therefore, to exercise our
common-law authority to increase the recovery opportunity
in circumstances where the state of mind of the bar owner
warrants it
In this manner, the tort action would
supplement, rather than conflict with, the [dramshop] act.
Id. (Italics in original.)
By chanu'Um/iii!.' llh ( «nnecticut dramshop statute's $20,000 damage
limitatic

nimum recovery" and a "floor," the Connecticut Supreme Court

seen is if > h,i ve considered the statute to be akin to a no-fault insurance polk \ \\ tr
tin >se who were injured by intoxicated persons but who could
negligence or causation. Thus, the Connecticut Supren
broad tort cause of action would not conflict v\

ided that a
remedial "floor"

provided by Connecticut's dramshop statute.
The United States submits (lut the dissent in Craig is the more wellreasoned opim<
creati*

dissent relied primarily on the fact that the majority"s
gligence cause of action would upset the legislature's policy

13

decisions with respect to the liability of dramshops, who prior to the adoption of
dramshop legislation had no common-law liability. "[T]he majority eviscerates a
scheme of recovery that the legislature crafted in reliance upon these very longstanding, but now abandoned, common-law precedents." IcL at 1023. The dissent
noted that the dramshop act was not an isolated statute, but rather a part of
comprehensive legislation governing alcohol distribution and sale. "The
pervasiveness of legislation in this area strongly suggests that the legislature, in
enacting standards of liability for sellers of alcohol for damage caused by their
intoxicated patrons, did not intend to leave for the courts the question of whether,
and under what circumstances, liability beyond the statutory limits may be
imposed on sellers for damage caused by their patrons." I d at 1025. The dissent
also expressed concern that this upheaval in dramshop liability would have a
significant effect on sellers of alcohol who had acted in reliance on the dramshop
statute, such as by obtaining liability insurance consistent with the statute's
liability limits. I d at 1026 n.6.
Utah's Dramshop Act is more comprehensive than Connecticut's, and thus
even more deserving of judicial deference. When the Utah legislature enacted the
Dramshop Act in 1981, it did so against the backdrop of the common-law rule
exempting dramshops from liability. The legislature determined as a matter of

14

policy that alcohol \H \ •> ft l a s should bear some responsibility for their actions.
I! 11 * 1 (,' )2 i s I a t u i c \ I»«1 i "i • I-' h o w o A r er, merely impose negligence liability on alcohol
I > 11 >
] \' 1111" t :•„ l! i * a pparent from the statute that the legislature determined that
unlimited negligence liability would be too burdensome on both plaintiffs J U J
defendants. Instead, the legislature imposed a form of strict

'

plaintiffs of the burden of proving negligence and pi casei \ tie t • \w - (1 K
r

circumstances that will give rise to liabn

the burden of proof

required for plaintiffs to estabi :
On the other hand Hit legislating • oncluded that alcohol providers should
not be expose*
on damage
1

financial liability. The Dramshop Act includes limits
c levied against alcohol providers. The Act limits the

* ' ocial hosts to cases where alcohol has been provided to a mino

addition, the Act establishes a shorter two-year statute of limitations
brought under the Act.
The terms of the Dramshop Act evidence J luLim nit! < >l considerations on
behalf of both injured parties
Court agrees with the J

The issue is not whether this
^licy decisions in crafting the Dramshop Act.

See Gottling v. F.K. incorporated, 61 P.3d at 997 ( " T h i s court cannot ignore or
<l M ke illm ii a* tct because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of
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wisdom is for the legislature to determine.'" (citing Masich v. U.S. Smelting. Ref.
& Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 625 (Utah 1948)). Rather, the issue is whether the
legislature intended to occupy the field of dramshop liability and thus preempt the
development of conflicting common-law claims. As discussed above, the
comprehensive nature of the Act demonstrates the legislature's intent to do so, and
this Court correctly so held in Gilger. The Court should decline Plaintiffs'
invitation to reverse course and override the legislature's policy decisions.
II.

Utah's Dramshop Act does not unconstitutionally limit Plaintiffs'
remedies.
A.

Open-Courts Provision

Plaintiffs contend that the Dramshop Act violates the open-courts provision
of the Utah Constitution (art. I, § 11), if the United States is not liable under either
the Dramshop Act or the common law. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 25-27.
Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, it is not Utah's Dramshop Act that bars their
claim but rather the United States' sovereign immunity, which is preserved under
the FTCA. Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs contend that there is a conflict between
the FTCA and the Utah Constitution, their argument must fail under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2).
Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribe of Texas v. Mattox. 650 F. Supp. 282, 289 (W.D.
Tex. 1986).
16

Moreover, rinmhfiV ;n irnment would fail even if it were not barred by the
Supremacy < lnn < I lie FTCA's limited waiver of the United States* immunity
. »|K ii - ihr Jo. HID certain claims that injured citizens would not otherwise11 have.
fact that Congress did not waive the federal govermi
all claims by injured persons does not mean that K

*

\ "deprived" of

anything. This Court has held that sovereign mimmiiiy dors not violate the opencourts provision of the Utah Co11si 11111 >««i • »i« I»« Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627
(Utah 1983), the plaintills yHij.;ii( ttaiiiajo-s (or losses suffered as a result of the
alleged failure 11\ ilit: %l.iti ni I 'lid and its Commissioner of Financial Institutions
to discharge litni <J,uuii »n functions with respect to the regulation of banks,
dishu'i i o»i!i t»ranted the state's motion to dismiss in part on the basis ol I Huh'1.
<

rnmental Immunity Act.
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the Governmei

violated the open-courts provision of the i

11 s (»11,111«•i

Act
Court rejected

that argument:
Sovereign immunity - the principle that the state cannot be
sued in its own courts without its consent - was a wellsettled principle of American common law at the time Utah
became a state
Article L § 11 of the Utah Constitution,
which prescribes that all courts shall be open and persons
shall not be barred from using them to redress injuries, was
not meant to create a new remedy or a new right of action.
. . . Consequently, Article I, § 11 worked no change in the
17

principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity
is not unconstitutional under that section.
658 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also DeBrv v. Noble. 889
P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) (holding that the open-courts provision is not violated by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's preservation of sovereign immunity for
negligent inspection of a building).
The same principle applies to Plaintiffs' argument in the present case. The
United States' sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs' claim, and the fact that Congress
has not waived immunity does not deprive Plaintiffs of any claim. Thus, even if
the Supremacy Clause did not bar Plaintiffs' argument, the FTCA's preservation
of sovereign immunity would not violate the open-courts provision of the Utah
Constitution.
B.

Equal Protection

Again, Plaintiffs' argument addresses the wrong statute. Plaintiffs' claim
under the Dramshop Act fails not because of any deficiency in the Act itself, but
because Congress has not waived the United States' sovereign immunity as to
strict-liability claims such as those brought under the Dramshop Act. If Plaintiffs
believe the FTCA violates their equal-protection rights, their argument must
proceed under the United States Constitution. The United States has briefed this
issue in the proceedings before the United States District Court, where it will be
18

decided after conclusion of the proceedings before this Court. See Defendant's
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (U.S. District Court record,
document 19) at 10-12.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the United States' Opening Brief, the
United States requests that this Court answer the issues certified by the United
States District Court as set forth in the United States' Opening Brief at 12-13.
DATED this 2°

day of August, 2003.
PAUL M. WARNER
United States Attorney

iLSON
United States Attorney
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